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Abstract
HEATHER SULLIVAN: Political Opening and Tactical Change: Mexican Protest,
1964-2000
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber)
This paper explores the relationship between democratic opening and contentious
politics. It focuses on one element of contentious politics, tactics, which are expected to
change substantially alongside the move from an authoritarian to a democratic regime.
Although the theories on tactical shifts in response to regime change were crafted in light of
the early European experience with democratization, this paper shows that the theory holds in
the radically different context of Mexico between 1964 and 2000. Tactics shifted from
predominantly direct to demonstrative forms of action with the political opening that
occurred during this period. As the political regime opened, even rural protesters shifted to a
heavier reliance on demonstrative tactics. This paper also illustrates that full democratization
is not required to precipitate the shift in tactics. During Mexico’s hybrid regime, from 1988
to 2000, popular mobilization took on democratic rather than authoritarian characteristics.
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Introduction
There has been considerable debate over the relationship between democratization
and political protest. Some scholars see outright peril in labor mobilization, asserting that
labor must subjugate its interests in order for democratic transition to occur (Przeworski
1986), while others argue that some limited mobilization of the working class is not only
acceptable, but often necessary to push democratization forward (Collier 1999;
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) and Tilly
(2004) are perhaps the strongest proponents of the importance of contentious politics to
democratization. They accept that the multitude of contingent factors erupting in cycles of
contention can lead to extremely varied outcomes, yet strongly maintain that: “democratic
polities form through contentious politics and reshape contentious politics as they form”
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).
This paper sets out to probe the second half of the relationship that McAdam et al
theorize; how does the formation of a democratic polity reshape contentious politics? I will
focus in particular on one element of contentious politics, tactics, which are expected to
change substantially in the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic context. First, I will
lay out the theories on how the political context affects contentious politics. Then, I will
frame the Mexican case in terms of the important historical developments and changing
political contexts both leading up to and during the period under examination. I will then
discuss the problems related to trying to operationalize and empirically probe some of the
extant theories with data from a modern, non-European case and then I will explore how
2protest tactics evolved alongside political opening in Mexico between 1964 and 2000.
Finally, I will examine and refute some alternate hypotheses that could be argued to explain
the evolution of tactics that I observe.
Review of the Literature: Changing Contexts, Changing Tactics
Scholars of social movements and contentious politics have long understood that
popular mobilization does not happen in a vacuum and that even when not focused on
distinctly political matters, protest cannot be understood in isolation from the political system
under which it takes place. Political opportunities, understood as state structure and strength,
as well as the forms of elite alliances, shape popular mobilization. Political opportunities
play a role in influencing not only whether mobilization occurs, but also the forms that
protest takes and the level of success that different tactics can achieve (McAdam 1982;
Tarrow 1998).
Yet what constitutes an opportunity and the ways in which political changes influence
protest is still an unsettled debate. For example, Kreisi (1996) argues that as institutional
access points open and the likelihood of repression decreases, both characteristic changes in
the process of democratization, civil society actors are more likely to mobilize. Gamson and
Meyer (1996), on the other hand, note the potentially complicated nature of political
opportunities. For example, while the introduction of competitive elections is assumed to
channel popular action in some direction, whether it serves to encourage or constrain
mobilization seems an open, contextually dependent question. O’Donnell and Schmitter
(1986) echo this sentiment, noting that some transitions cause a popular upsurge while others
do not. Roberts (1997) also observes that democratization “may provide social actors with
new channels of access to political institutions, but it can also remove authoritarian rulers
3against which opposition forces unified and mobilized, inject divisive forms of partisan
competition into social organizations, and resurrect political parties and electoral activities
that can siphon off energy from social networks” (139).
Hipsher (1996) argues forcefully that democratization leads to movement
demobilization. She asserts that in order not to jeopardize transitions social actors are likely
to acquiesce to limited democracy, defined as “the absence of military rule” (274). She
attributes this change in part to the power that a social movement’s connection to a political
party has in defining the tactics the movement employs. In the post-transition period,
Hipsher considers institutionalization and demobilization of movements to be in the interests
of the political parties in light of their nascent integration into the political regime. Herbert
Kitschelt (1986) explains tactical shifts in a similar way, though the political structure is
important in and of itself, without the necessary intervening variable of political parties. In
an examination of democracies, he notes that more open systems invite “assimilitative
strategies,” which use institutional mechanisms to make demands, while closed systems
trigger “confrontational, disruptive strategies orchestrated outside established policy
channels” (66, italics in original).
The distinct approaches chosen and the manner in which claims are expressed can be
understood in terms of the repertoire of contention. Tactics are the maneuvers used by
protesters and it is their ability to wield them and disrupt everyday politics, extract direct
concessions, or influence public opinion that gives contentious politics its power. Changes in
political opportunities may require changes in tactics, but this is only possible within certain
bounds. What falls within these bounds has come to be called the repertoire of contention.
Tarrow (1998), leaning heavily on work by Tilly, explained the repertoire as:
4A limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a
relatively deliberate process of choice. The limits of that learning constrain the
choices available for collective interaction and lay the foundation for future
choices. People experiment with new forms in the search for tactical
advantage, but they do so in small ways, at the edge of well-established
routines (30).
While changes are thus typically slow to happen, it has been postulated that there are
two major exceptions which can lead to more decisive change. The first powerful change in
repertoire happened in a particular historical moment and context. In Western Europe circa
the 1770s, nation state penetration of society, democratization, and the rise of capitalism
created a marked change in the repertoire, dividing protest into two distinct forms, pre-
modern and modern. During this period, European countries experienced rapid urbanization
and increasing concentrations of capital. The increased resources available to governments
opened space for the creation of national educational systems, which put emphasis on
national languages, cultures, and histories. Levels of literacy grew and print media in the
form of newspapers and pamphlets came to be read by a wider, more economically and
geographically diverse audience. This period marked the birth of national citizenship and
identity, as well as the birth of modern popular media, which increased the salience of the
state as a target for contentious politics while simultaneously creating a public print forum in
which grievances could be expressed and shared and protest tactics diffused (Tarrow 1998;
Tilly 2004).
It was between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries in Europe that the modern
repertoire of contention developed. The pre-modern repertoire had been marked by protest
that was contained within and pertained to a single locality. The tactics were very issue and
place specific with direct, disruptive, unsustained action used against local antagonists while
5intermediaries were used when authorities outside of the locality were targeted (Tarrow
1998; Tilly 1983). Examples of pre-modern protests include food riots, invasions of
forbidden territories, attacks on property, public taunting of antagonists, and the use of
accepted public events such as funerals or parades to express political claims (Tilly 1983).
The modern repertoire solidified in the nineteenth century and is marked by the shift to
autonomous actions that are national in scope and conducive to coordination among
localities. Strikes, electoral rallies, public meetings, marches, and demonstrations are the
principle and paradigmatic forms of protest in the modern repertoire.
Tarrow (1998) expands on this distinction by specifying a particular shift in the types
of tactics employed. The premodern forms of protest were “aimed mainly at extracting
claims directly from antagonists or taking vengeance upon them,” while modern forms were
much more performance oriented, designed to change public opinion and influence national
politics or politicians (94). Tarrow notes that this type of performance protest emerged in the
nineteenth century, but that it was not until the twentieth century “with the development of
mass media and the growing role of states and third parties in determining the outcomes of
protest, that the performance of political protest has become routine and professional” (94).
While Europe’s political, economic, and societal changes dramatically reshaped
European protest forms, the rest of the world did not simultaneously experience this change.
The factor which is thought to spur the second decisive shift in repertoire in other parts of the
world and at other points in time is the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.
Democratization is thought to transform contentious politics by altering the way in which
grievances are expressed (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004).
Tilly (2004) asserts that under undemocratic regimes protest is rarely tolerated and, therefore,
6arises in two distinct forms; “either it adopts forbidden clandestine attacks on officials or it
crowds into the relatively protected spaces of authorized public gatherings such as funerals,
holidays, and civic ceremonies” (30). Tilly expects democratic protest to be less deadly and
less destructive than its authoritarian counterpart and considers it more likely to be
sanctioned by the regime as a legitimate form of participation. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
(2001) explain this shift more explicitly, noting:
First, on the whole, democratization greatly limits life- and property-
threatening forms of public, collective claim making, substituting for them
highly visible but less directly destructive varieties of interaction. Second, in
democratic regimes, in the average, threats and declared intentions to act in a
certain way (instead of nonnegotiable direct actions) occupy much more
central positions in popular politics than they do in nondemocratic regimes
(269).
The characteristics of pre-modern and modern repertoires get overlaid onto the
authoritarian and democratic repertoires, respectively. Tilly (2004) repeats his earlier
distinction between pre-modern and modern protest yet here he explicitly attributes the
change in tactics to democratization. Democratization, he asserts, shifts the repertoire from
“predominantly parochial, particular, and bifurcated interactions based largely on embedded
identities to predominantly cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous interactions based
largely on detached identities” (8). Yet by collapsing the changes that occurred in Europe
during the period of democratization to this single dimension, he glosses over the additional
factors on which modern contention seems to lie such as urbanization, industrialization, and
modernization of the press.
In addition, Tilly (2004) fails to address the role that uneven development might play
in these tactical shifts. Uneven development implies the continued existence of rural areas
and it has been theorized that the rural versus urban protest repertoire, much like the
7authoritarian-democratic dichotomy, tends to map onto the pre-modern/modern distinction
(Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Wood 2003). Tilly and Wood (2003) provide evidence of the rural-
urban distinction in their examination of three counties in Great Britain, one urban, one
industrial, and one rural. After parliamentarization, the urban-industrial counties shifted
toward the modern repertoire, but the rural county, which also exhibited lower levels of
contentious claims-making, did not. Rural protest remained split between personalized,
direct action and indirect petitioning. If rural protest tends to predominantly take on a pre-
modern form, failing to consider uneven development could potentially be a serious
oversight in countries where, despite industrialization, rural populations remain high.
Another question that remains unanswered by Tilly’s theory based on the early
European experience is how should protest appear in the context of hybrid regimes? Hybrid
regimes are regimes that combine features of democracy alongside features of
authoritarianism (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002). There has been a
relatively recent proliferation of these hybrids, which has prompted various attempts to
classify regimes along a more nuanced continuum rather than simply forcing them into a
simple democratic or authoritarian category. Diamond (2002) identifies six regime types:
liberal democracy, electoral democracy, ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarian,
hegemonic electoral authoritarian, and politically closed authoritarian, listed in order of
decreasing openness. Schedler (2002), collapsing this typology into four slightly broader
categories of liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and closed
authoritarianism, notes that in 2001 fifty eight regimes, or thirty eight percent of the world’s
regimes, fell into the category he termed electoral authoritarianism. Although there are now
8considerable numbers of hybrid regimes, their characteristics and internal dynamics are not
fully understood.
This paper will explore the nature of protest in Mexico, where a closed authoritarian
regime gradually shifted to a semi-authoritarian hybrid before transitioning to democracy in
2000. While protest is expected to look one way in democracies and another in authoritarian
regimes the spaces in between are not well theorized. Mexico is an excellent case to examine
the forms that protest takes under various regime types, as well as how protest evolves in
response to slow political opening. Mexico also provides an interesting test of whether
theories based on the early European democratization experience can be applied to the late
democratizers, such as Mexico, where democratization, urbanization, industrialization, and
modernization may not have been bundled in the same way and where economic
development has been decidedly uneven.
Mexico in Historical Perspective
In Mexico, unlike in the early European democratizers, consolidation of the state,
industrialization, urbanization, increased literacy and the birth of a modern popular press, and
the rise of national identity preceded democratization by many years. In the 1870s, under
Porfirio Díaz, the central state began consolidating its power and curtailing that of the
regional strongmen throughout the territory. This consolidation paved the way for the first
wave of industrialization. Beginning in the 1890s, the transition from small-scale family
production methods to factories producing for national markets began and the diversity of
goods produced increased substantially (Haber 1989). Collier and Collier (2002) note that,
“Mexico had a remarkably large industrial workforce at an early point...[and] developed the
9earliest and one of the stronger labor movements in the region [prior to the reform period,
which Collier and Collier consider as beginning in 1911]” (76-77).
The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) disrupted industrial production, but the
infrastructure and factories built during the Díaz dictatorship survived the period of civil
unrest largely intact (Haber 1989). During the post-revolutionary presidency of Lázaro
Cárdenas (1934-40), investment in infrastructure surged with increased construction of
irrigation systems, roads, water and sewage systems, and schools (Mosk 1950). The legacies
left by Díaz and Cárdenas provided the foundation for the rapid industrial development that
occurred under Presidents Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-46) and Miguel Alemán (1946-52),
whose economic policies centered around industrialization (Haber 1989; Mosk 1950).
With industrial output rising throughout the fifties, substantial rural to urban
migration took place. Urbanization was occurring, but development was extremely uneven
(Sherman 2000) and this pattern of uneven development has persisted. In 2000, 16 percent
of the nation’s workforce was employed in the agricultural sector. However, there was
considerable variance by state. The percentage ranged from 3 percent employed in
agriculture in Nuevo León to 47 percent in Chiapas (INEGI 2000).
The processes of industrialization and urbanization happened concurrent with the
project of state consolidation, which relied in part on the creation of a national education
system and a modern media. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, only shortly after the
technology was developed in Europe, daguerreotypes and lithography appeared in Mexico.
Although literacy rates remained low in the nineteenth century, an assortment of magazines
and papers, including a few aimed at urban workers, began to be published on a daily or
weekly basis (Rubenstein 2000). It was not until after the Revolution, however, that a
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Mexican national identity crystallized. Middlebrook (1995) asserts that the revolution
sparked the creation of a national consciousness and that this new nationalism was centered
around support for the revolutionary state. The post-revolutionary presidents continued the
work begun by Díaz to consolidate power in the center away from regional leaders; creating
a national public education system served this goal. Middlebrook goes on to note that
President Obregón (1920-24) invested significant resources in public education and literacy
campaigns as a way “to forge a cohesive sense of national identity and cement popular
support for the new regime” (26).
An explosion in daily papers occurred between 1920 and 1940, by the end of which
newsstands existed in most towns. The first radio transmission was broadcast in 1923 and
radio soon became another important tool for building national consciousness. Every station
had to carry certain government mandated programs and by the 1940s there was also a
considerable body of national music, national sportscasts, and national soap operas
(Rubenstein 2000). While state control of media content was strong, Rubenstein contends
that dissenting voices gained a presence in the national discourse during the 1950s.
Thus, by the time period under study in this paper (1964-2000) Mexico had made
many of the same advances that are understood to have contributed to the shift in the
repertoire of contention in the European countries. Yet while the period of state
consolidation, industrialization, and modernization overlapped with the period of political
liberalization in much of Western Europe, this was not the case in Mexico. In Mexico these
modernizing developments took place many years prior to democratization. In addition,
Mexican development has been decidedly uneven with the southern states remaining, on
average, much more rural than the northern states.
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Political Liberalization in Mexico
Mexico has been holding elections faithfully every six years since 1929 with
presidential succession occurring at each election. Yet despite stable civilian rule, Mexico
was a one party system, where the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) held
presidential power for 71 years and where, prior to each election, the president selected his
successor. Then, in the year 2000, with the election of Vicente Fox of the Partido Acción
Nacional (PAN), the PRI was finally voted out of office and peacefully relinquished control.
This was heralded as what Andreas Schedler (2005) termed “Mexico’s velvet transition from
electoral authoritarianism” (32). While the alternation of the executive finally bumped
Mexico over into the democratic camp, the political liberalizations that led to this transition
in power began much earlier. The electoral reforms enacted after 1960 changed the political
landscape and slowly created space for opposition parties to voice dissent.
Prior to 1963 electoral reform worked against opposition parties, reinforcing the
PRI’s control of the political system. While the post-1963 reforms are also largely seen as
attempts by the PRI to enhance their flagging legitimacy, these reforms also served to begin
opening the political system. The 1963 reform designated a number of seats in the Chamber
of Deputies for any party that received more than 2.5 percent of the vote, but the reform
failed to increase the opposition in the congress in part because of the continued exclusion of
some parties and in part because no party could reach even that threshold. In 1973 the
threshold was lowered to 1.5 percent and requirements for party registration were loosened,
still without much substantive effect (Cornelius 1987; Middlebrook 1985).
The failure of these reforms became particularly evident in 1976 when, to the
embarrassment of the PRI, the PAN failed to run a presidential candidate, eliminating even
12
the appearance of competition. Thus, shortly after assuming the presidency López Portillo
enacted the 1977 electoral reform. This reform increased the size of the Chamber of
Deputies to 400 and reserved 100 seats for minority parties to be allocated through
proportional representation. It also opened up opposition access to media by providing
public financing for campaigns and the left was reincorporated into the political system.
While this substantially opened access, the PRI also maintained a number of safeguards to
ensure their dominance. And when the safeguards failed, opposition victory was averted by
resorting to massive fraud (Cornelius 1987; Klesner 1997). Even so, the opposition presence
in the Chamber of Deputies increased after 1979, making it a “new forum for opposition
activity” (Middlebrook 1985).
In 1982 de la Madrid was elected president. In December of that year protests
erupted over electoral fraud on the municipal level and, early in his term, de la Madrid opted
to negotiate rather than repress electoral protests. But in 1983, the PAN won more local
elections than the local PRI strongmen were willing to accept and de la Madrid’s
commitment to liberalization flagged. Then, in 1984, local elections in several cities sparked
riots which were violently suppressed by the police and army (Cornelius 1987).
The surge in opposition activity that resulted from the 1976 reforms and de la
Madrid’s initially conciliatory response to protest created an effect quite contrary to the
reform’s goal; as Klesner (1997) states, “far from legitimizing the government's rule as they
had in the past, elections were beginning to be delegitimizing” (10, italics in original). So, in
1986, de la Madrid passed another electoral reform. This reform increased the size of the
Chamber of Deputies to 500 and added another 100 proportional representation (PR) seats,
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but it also opened the PR seats up to the majority party and strengthened executive control
over elections (Klesner 1997).
Nineteen eighty eight represents a turning point in Mexico; it is often considered the
year in which political pluralism came to replace one-party hegemony (Camp 1999; Harvey
1993). Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who had broken away from the PRI, ran against Carlos
Salinas in a presidential election marked by extensive fraud. Although the vote count
favored Salinas, it was clear that PRI support had waned significantly. In addition, the PRI
lost its two thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and with it, its ability to unilaterally
amend the constitution (Camp 1999). And by 1989, even governorships were beginning to
be taken by opposition party candidates (Levy and Bruhn 1999).
Further reforms were passed in 1989-1990. One component of these reforms had a
regressive impact on opposition opportunities in the Chamber of Deputies; the reform
stipulated that if a party won 35 percent of the federal vote, they would receive the majority
of the seats in the Chamber, a condition the PRI was guaranteed to meet. However, the
reform also established an independent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which further
reforms in 1993, 1994, and 1996 strengthened. The 1993, 1994, and 1996 reforms also put
limits on campaign spending, increased public financing, and increased media access
(Klesner 1997). In 1997, the PRI lost control of the Chamber of Deputies and lost its two-
thirds majority in the Senate. In 2000, they lost the presidency.
Another way to examine the unfolding of the political reform is to consider Mexico’s
classification in polychotomous regime categories. For example, Smith (2005) created a
regime categorization wherein countries with free and fair national elections are considered
democracies, countries with free, but not fair elections or systems in which elected leaders
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are not the true power holders are considered electoral semi-democracies, countries with fair
elections, but a limited franchise are considered competitive oligarchies, and all else is a
nondemocracy. Under his classification, Mexico was coded a nondemocracy from 1929-
1987, a semi-democracy from 1988-1999, and a democracy in 2000. Mainwaring et al
(2001) use a slightly different set of criteria, which includes the protection of civil and
political liberties as part of democratic governance. Using their slightly different criteria,
they also consider pre-1988 a nondemocratic period and 1988-1999 a period of semi-
democracy. Hagopian and Mainwaring (2005) extended this regime classification from
1999, where the Mainwaring et al cut off, to 2003 and classify Mexico as democratic
beginning in 2000 as well.
The gradual opening of the political system that began in the 1960s and the eleven
year period of semi-democracy makes Mexico an interesting case for probing the relationship
between political opening and tactical change in protest. The protest data, which span 1964-
2000, overlaps nicely with Mexico’s period of democratic opening.
Description of Protest Data
My empirical research was conducted using the Mexican Popular Contention
Database which generously was made available by Takeshi Wada. Wada collected data from
newspaper accounts of every disruptive event during the twenty-nine day period around each
presidential and midterm election. This method of sampling introduces an obvious bias;
electoral protests, which only occur around elections, are overrepresented in the sample.
These protests are also overwhelmingly demonstrative (see Appendix A). While the
changing importance of electoral protest is itself an important part of the response to political
opening, having it so heavily weighted in the sample leaves an open question as to whether
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the character of protest changed more generally or whether the results are driven by the
electoral protest alone. To correct for this, data will be examined both with and without the
electoral protests.
The analysis presented here utilizes the data from the newspaper, Excélsior, which
covers the period from 1964-2000 (in three year intervals). Wada (2004) notes that Excélsior
has “assumed a political stance close to the elites” (245). Thus, in his data collection he also
sampled from La Jornada, a paper more sympathetic to the opposition. However, the data
from La Jornada does not begin until 1979. The two sources cannot be combined because
the same event may be recorded in each, causing them to be double counted and skewing the
results. Since I have a theoretical interest in how protest tactics change over time the
Excélsior data provides more thorough coverage. Data from La Jornada are used to cross-
check the patterns that emerge and similar results are obtained.
Unfortunately, there are problems inherent in conducting event analysis with data
from newspaper accounts. As Myers (2000) notes:
Bias exists not only in the specific information reported about events,
but also in whether the event is reported at all...news media are more
likely to report events that involve larger numbers of people
and...events near the media source are more likely to be reported than
those farther away (182).
While it is difficult to determine whether the Wada data has an overrepresentation of larger
protest, it does appear that the proximity bias might have influenced the reporting.
Significantly more protest actions were reported for Mexico City than any other Mexican
state. While it is conceivable that there are more protest events in Mexico City due to its
political importance, it could also be an artifact of over-reporting since both Excélsior and La
Jornada are headquartered in the capital.
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While problems of reporting bias exist in all countries, there may be country-specific
biases as well due to the authoritarian features of the Mexican regime during the time period
considered. Intimidation of reporters and self-censorship existed and to some extent continue
to exist today (Orme 1997); yet the Mexican print media has historically been relatively free
(Levy and Bruhn 1999; Middlebrook 1995). Newspaper accounts, while imperfect, are one
of the only windows onto how people protest. The accounts reported reflect the protest
activities that were important enough to receive public attention, and as such they also reflect
the changing importance of some types of tactics over others. Even though gaps in coverage
exist, the rough picture of Mexican protest provided by these data can serve to deepen our
understanding of concrete ways in which protest changes.
Problems and Possibilities in the Categorization of Protest Tactics
The extant theory that democratization shifts the repertoire of contention from a pre-
modern to a modern form needs to be specified more clearly in order to put it into an
empirically testable form. While the theory may allow for multiple dimensions to be
explored, I will focus solely on the type of protest tactics employed. Therefore it is necessary
to define what criteria will be used to categorize certain tactics as non-democratic, as
opposed to democratic. Non-democratic tactics are those that are direct and disruptive. They
include acts that can directly extract claims as well as those that are acts of vengeance, such
as attacks on persons or property. Democratic tactics, on the other hand, are demonstrative
and conducive to coordination. They are designed as performances to influence political
leaders or public opinion. I will henceforth refer to the two categories of tactics as direct and
demonstrative.
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Some protest tactics easily fit into categories designed as such. Kidnappings, attacks,
seizure or destruction of land or property, forced removal from a previously occupied
location, prison escapes, and impeding the activities of others all clearly fall into the direct
category. Likewise, demonstrations, dramatizations, and sit-ins fit nicely into the
demonstrative category. Yet there were a variety of other tactics employed in Mexico
between 1964 and 2000 that are more difficult to categorize.
For example, hunger strikes are clearly symbolic acts, yet they imply a direct and
forceful act aimed at the self. And road blocks, while highly disruptive, are also
performances intended to influence an often national audience. In addition, boycotts and
refusing to pay for services also contain direct and demonstrative elements. These tactics
allow for the direct extraction of a claim (nonpayment) or for the direct punishment of an
adversary (boycott), but I argue that used collectively, the goal of these tactics is to influence
public opinion in order to address a larger issue or claim. Because these tactics are designed
primarily to make public statements, I will code these tactics as demonstrative for my
analysis.
Strikes, as well as the related tactics of work and service stoppages, also contain
elements of both direct and demonstrative action. In the European context, strikes were a
distinctly modern phenomenon. But is it therefore appropriate to map them onto the
democratic side of the non-democratic/democratic distinction? The shift to modernity
involved more than just political changes. I assert that the strike was borne out of the change
in the organization of production, an economic change, rather than a change in political
organization. This is supported by the presence of strikes as prominent forms of contention
in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Therefore it does not necessarily follow that
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the strike should be categorized as a “democratic” form of contention even though it has been
considered a modern, rather than pre-modern, tactic. A further reason why strikes appear to
fit into the non-democratic category is that intermediaries, in the form of union leaders, are
often employed to interface with management, which often in the Mexican case was the
government. The use of intermediaries is one of the main features of non-democratic protest.
For the purpose of my analysis, strikes and other forms of work stoppages will be considered
a direct action because I assert that the main goal is to directly extract an economic claim.
However, because strikes have been considered such an important type of contention, I will
subsequently examine them in greater detail.
Patterns of Protest
Between 1964 and 2000 the predominant tactical form shifted from direct to
demonstrative actions. During the authoritarian period (1964-1985), 544 protest actions were
reported in the full Excélsior sample. On average, only 34 percent of these actions used
demonstrative tactics. However, the trend throughout the period was toward an increase in
the overall number of actions and toward an increasing number of demonstrative tactics. In
1985, demonstrative tactics surpassed direct tactics as the most utilized form of action in the
full sample. Though the two forms came close to parity in 1991, the use of demonstrative
tactics never fell below the use of direct tactics after 1985.
In the semi-democratic period (1988-1997), 889 actions were recorded and the
average of demonstrative tactics used had increased to 71 percent of all actions. The only
data available for the democratic period are from 2000. Two hundred and twenty actions
were reported of which 63 percent were demonstrative. While this is actually a slightly
lower percentage than those reported in the semi-democratic period, it may be due to the
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perception that the 2000 elections were cleaner and therefore incited less protest than, for
example, the 1988 elections. This perception of clean elections has not transferred onto the
2006 elections, which have been marked by massive protest. Further data will need to be
gathered for a more definitive understanding of Mexican protest in the democratic period.
Figure 1: Direct/Demonstrative Tactics, Counts by Year
Source: Excélsior
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The trend is even clearer if the presidential elections are separated out from the mid-
term elections. The Mexican system over the period under examination was highly
centralized. The executive initiated all important policy decisions and even as reforms were
being passed to make Congress more competitive for the opposition, centralized presidential
powers were preserved (Camp 1999). The continued importance of the president meant that
presidential elections provided a more compelling focal point for protest. Looking at only
presidential election years smoothes the results; demonstrative tactics increase steadily both
overall and relative to direct tactics up until 2000 when there is a slight drop in overall
actions.
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Figure 2: Direct/Demonstrative Tactics, Counts by Year
Presidential Election Years Only
Source: Excélsior
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While these results appear to support the extant theory, it could be argued that
electoral protest are driving the results. In order to correct for the overrepresentation of
electoral protest, I have examined the nonelectoral protests alone. The results are
unexpectedly strong.
Figure 3: Direct/Demonstrative Tactics, Counts by Year
Nonelectoral Protest Only
Source: Excélsior
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As seen in Figure 3, demonstrative tactics trend upward across the period despite the
exclusion of electoral protests. In 1988, the first year of semi-democracy, demonstrative
tactics come to represent a larger proportion of overall tactics than direct tactics. While this
reverses with demonstrative tactics dropping slightly below direct in 1991, the rise in
demonstrative tactics relative to direct tactics after 1991 is dramatic. The pattern also holds
when examining the shifts by period. In the authoritarian period, only 27 percent of
nonelectoral protest recorded was demonstrative. This figure jumps to 61 percent in the
semi-democratic period. Unlike the full sample, which shows an 8 percent drop in
demonstrative tactics, the nonelectoral protest remains steadier between the semi-democratic
and democratic periods, dropping only one percent to 60 percent of protest in 2000. This
supports the hypothesis that the elections in the semi-democratic period were more highly
protested than those in 2000.
Figure 4: Direct/Demonstrative Tactics, Counts by Year
Source: La Jornada
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La Jornada shows a similar pattern though when the earlier years of authoritarianism
are excluded, the results are less dramatic. In the authoritarian period covered by La Jornada
(1979-1985), 249 actions were recorded of which an average of 61 percent were
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demonstrative. In the semi-democratic period (1988-1997), 948 actions were reported with
an increase in the average of demonstrative tactics to 75 percent. In 2000, the sole year
representing the democratic period, there were 243 actions. Similar to the Excélsior data, the
La Jornada sample shows a slight drop in demonstrative tactics, though in this case only to
72 percent.
These data support the hypothesis that democratization drives changes in the tactics
employed in protest. They also suggest that a transition to full democracy is not needed to
produce the shift. In Mexico, slow political opening created gradual shifts in tactics. Yet,
during the period of semi-democracy, democratic tactics predominated. The evidence also
suggests that Mexico’s uneven development did not hinder the overall tactical shift at the
national level.
Figure 5: Protest Actions Conducted by Campesinos/Indigenous
Source: Excélsior
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What is interesting to note about the uneven development hypothesis is that, in
contrast to Tilly and Wood’s (2003) findings, peasant protest tactics in Mexico followed the
same trajectory as protest more generally. This pattern can be seen by separating out protest
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actions that were recorded as being carried out by campesinos (peasants) or indigenous
people, who are overwhelmingly rural.
Looking only at campesino/indigenous protest actions, I find that political opening
was accompanied by an increase in the number of protest actions as well as a shift towards
demonstrative tactics. This suggests that in the modern period political opening causes
tactical shifts for rural and urban dwellers alike.
Alternate Hypotheses
A series of economic crises and reforms took place concurrent with Mexico’s
political opening. The first balance of payments crisis occurred in 1976, though adjustment
measures were avoided thanks to massive oil discoveries. However, the price of oil fell in
1981 and Mexico found itself in the midst of a serious debt crisis by 1982. President López
Portillo devalued the peso and adopted contractionary fiscal policies, yet capital flight
continued, commercial lending dried up abruptly, and foreign reserves reached record lows.
He then nationalized the banking sector (Lustig 1998).
In December, de la Madrid assumed the presidency amidst the crisis and initially
devalued the currency and implemented fiscal austerity measures. Another balance of
payments crisis followed in 1985 and by the middle of that year de la Madrid began
liberalizing trade. In 1986 there was another oil shock. In the same year Mexico entered into
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Nineteen eighty-seven brought a
speculative attack on the peso, prompting de la Madrid to introduce the Economic Solidarity
Pact. The Pact added “the use of incomes policy to fiscal and monetary discipline” (Lustig
1998).
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Carlos Salinas replaced de la Madrid as president in December 1988 and further
pushed neoliberal economic reforms. In 1990, Salinas reprivatized the banks and sped the
process that de la Madrid had initiated of privatizing the public enterprises. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was approved in 1993 and took effect in January
of 1994, further opening trade between Mexico and its neighbors to the north. Though
Mexico experienced another crisis in 1994 – the peso crisis – recovery was much quicker
than it had been after the previous crises (Lustig 1998).
Kurtz (2004) argues that the shift to an open economy eliminates the institutional
channels through which people can mobilize, making collective action difficult if not
impossible. He asserts that neoliberal economic reforms, such as those undertaken in Mexico
during the 1980s and 1990s, have a severely atomizing effect. In the face of poverty,
inequality, unemployment, and declining real wages Kurtz sees a sea of silent masses. Thus
he claims that economic liberalization has raised nearly insurmountable barriers to collective
action. Mexico served as a paradigmatic case. While it is difficult to untangle the effects of
the political changes from the economic ones due to their contemporaneous occurrence,
economic liberalization must be considered as a possible factor affecting tactical choice.
These economic changes could work either to reinforce or to undercut the shifts toward
demonstrative tactics.
While I do not find support for the hypothesis that the neoliberal era is marked by
popular silence, there are several important aspects of Kurtz’s data that may be affecting the
difference in results. Kurtz looks only at antigovernment demonstrations and riots that
involve at least 100 participants. The data from the Mexican Popular Contention Database
(MPCD) include any protest with more than 20 participants, in addition to hunger strikes
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regardless of the number of people involved. The possibility exists that the increase in the
number of actions in the MPCD is not driven by a decrease in barriers to collective action
spurred by political opening; rather, the increase could reflect a splintering of protest into
more numerous actions that involve fewer people. This would support Kurtz’s thesis that
economic liberalization raises high barriers against organized collective action.
I do not find support for this alternate hypothesis. Even when all protests with less
than 100 participants are excluded, more actions are recorded in the later period. In the full
sample, the result is dramatic: in the post-debt crisis period (1982-2000) on average 91
protest actions were reported per year, while the more economically closed period (1964-
1979) averages only 16 protest actions per year. Even when considering only non-electoral
protests the post-debt crisis period averaged 49 protest actions per year, while the earlier
period averaged only 14 protest actions per year. If the neoliberal era is considered to begin
in 1988 to correspond with what Kurtz considers the height of neoliberal reform, similar
results are obtained.
Figure 6: Protest Actions with 100 or More Participants
Nonelectoral Protest Only
Source: Excélsior
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Kurtz also argues that strikes declined significantly due to the economic reforms.
Since I consider strikes a direct tactic, it might be argued that a decreased ability to strike,
resulting from economic not political changes, is driving the shift towards more
demonstrative tactics. In line with Kurtz’s argument, the Mexican Popular Contention data
also show a decrease in the number of official strikes. However, if wildcat strikes and
service stoppages are included, the picture changes radically. Excepting a high peak of strike
activity in 1982, my data do not show an overall drop in the use of the strike. The decrease
in official strikes was counterbalanced by the rise in wildcat strikes. Therefore, the rise in the
proportion of demonstrative tactics should not be seen as an artifact of a labor force
responding to economic reforms with decreased activity.
Figure 7: Official and Wildcat Strikes, Counts by Year
Source: Excélsior
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Aside from the role strikes have in the overall makeup of contentious actions, the nature of
the strike as a tactic may itself have evolved over time. Tilly and Shorter (1971) assert that
between 1830 and 1960 modernization changed the shape of strikes in France. Early strikes
were longer in duration and involved low numbers of people, whereas modern strikes have
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shifted to short events, involving large numbers of participants. The earlier strikes were
more difficult to organize and therefore drew strength from their endurance while the modern
strikes derive power from the symbolic show of strength derived from mass participation.
The modern strike, as conceived of by Shorter and Tilly, might then be considered a
demonstrative rather than direct tactic.
Figure 8: Strikes Separated by Type, Counts by Year
Source: Excélsior
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Perhaps due to the fact that the modernization of Mexican industry precedes the
period under examination in this paper, a similar pattern does not emerge between 1964 and
2000 in Mexico. If Mexican strikes are categorized according to their duration and the
number of participants, with long strikes considered those over five days and large strikes
those with at least 500 participants, the bulk of the strikes fall outside the two categories of
strikes theorized by Shorter and Tilly. In fact, only 17 percent of the strikes in the Excélsior
sample are short and large and there is little variance in the percentage across the three
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political periods. However, prior to the debt crisis (1964-1979) only 11 percent of the strikes
were short and large, while in the post-crisis period (1982-2000) 20 percent were.1
While the Mexican strike does not seem to have evolved in the same manner as the
French strike, the type of claim that accompanies Mexican strikes has changed across time.
Again political rather than economic changes seem to be driving the shift. In the
authoritarian period, 16 percent of the strikes reported by Excélsior had political claims. If
the period is restricted to the earliest, most closed years in the sample, from 1964-1973, the
number of strikes with political claims jumps to 70 percent. In the semi-democratic period,
only 8 percent of the strikes have political claims. Oddly, in the year 2000, strikes with
political claims increased to 33 percent. While more data are needed to explore the
democratic context, the data suggest that the goals of strikes may differ under differing
political contexts.
Figure 9: Direct/Demonstrative Tactics, Counts by Year
Strikes and Stoppages Excluded
Source: Excélsior
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1 These figures are computed with the 66 Telmex strikes that occurred over the period of a few days across
Mexico in 1982, collapsed into one short and large strike (as opposed to 66 short small strikes). If the Telmex
strikes are left in individually the figure of short, large strikes drops to only ten percent and the difference
between the pre- and post-debt periods disappears.
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While coding the strikes according to Tilly and Shorter’s symbolic protest criteria did
not change the overall pattern of tactics, the evidence on differing goals suggests that the
nature of strikes may, in fact, be more complex than the blunt coding of strikes as a direct
tactic reflects. Therefore, I have excluded strikes from the analysis in order to provide a
further test of the robustness of my results on overall tactical change.
Though in 1979, direct and demonstrative tactics achieve parity, all other years prior
to 1985 show a higher proportion of direct tactics. In 1985, demonstrative tactics become
predominant and remain so through 2000. Thus, even with the exclusion of strikes and
stoppages, the results showing a tactical shift hold.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that contentious politics change with democratic
openings. The shift from direct to demonstrative protest tactics in Mexico occurred long
after industrialization and in spite of uneven development. As the political regime opened,
even rural protesters shifted to a heavier reliance on demonstrative tactics. The results are
not driven by the overrepresentation of electoral protests in the sample nor are they driven by
changes in strike patterns alone. This suggests that political change is the most salient factor
affecting tactical choices.
In addition, this paper illustrates that full democratization is not required to
precipitate the shift in tactics. During Mexico’s hybrid regime, from 1988 to 2000, popular
mobilization took on democratic rather than authoritarian characteristics. While the
authoritarian period in Mexico was marked by few protest actions and the predominance of
direct tactics, during the hybrid period the level of protest actions increased and
demonstrative tactics became the main tactical form. Because Mexico’s transition to
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democracy was so recent, further research is needed to investigate the patterns of protest
tactics in the post-2000 democratic period.
One interesting wrinkle in the results is that when electoral protests are included, the
shift to “democratic” tactics actually precedes the shift to semi-democracy as marked by
scholars. From this finding, one might infer that the institutional reforms, which altered
electoral politics, happened at a different pace from other political changes which affect
protest, such as reductions in the application of repression. Inconsistent use of repressions
and concessions in electoral protests in the early 1980s may have sparked increased levels of
mobilization around elections, while not affecting protest more generally. Exploring in detail
the particular mechanisms through which democratization affects protest would be a fruitful
direction for further research.
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Appendix A: Direct/Demonstrative Tactics, Counts by Year
Electoral Protest Only
Source: Excélsior
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